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COLLOQUIUM:
THE JUDICIAL NOMINATION AND
CONFIRMATION PROCESS

PROBING VIEWS AND ALLEGATIONS IN THE
CONFIRMATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES
JUDGE JON O.

NEWMAN*

Recent events have focused public attention on two critical aspects of the process by which the United States Senate decides
whether to "advise and consent" to the appointment of federal
judges. The first concerns the legitimate scope of questioning
about a nominee's views. The second concerns the appropriate
procedure for ascertaining facts about allegations of misconduct.
I.

SCOPE OF QUESTIONING

As the Supreme Court's task of interpreting the Constitution
has drawn it into decisions concerning a wide range of human activity, it is not surprising that keen interest should be expressed
about the views of those being considered to become members of
* Judge Newman is a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
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the Court. In an earlier time, when the business of the Court primarily concerned technical fields of law such as admiralty and
commercial transactions, one could reasonably argue that inquiry
of a nominee, beyond baseline matters such as education, experience, judicial temperament, and character, should be confined to
ascertaining whether the nominee has demonstrated a high degree of proficiency in the substance of the law-whether the nominee has demonstrated the capacity to think carefully about legal
issues, reason soundly, and write clearly and even forcefully.
Vital as these talents are to the craft of judging, they will not
suffice to guide a selection process for judges who will be deciding
what the general terms of the Constitution mean in specific contexts such as legislative reapportionment, abortion, prayers in
public schools, or discrimination based on race, national origin,
gender, poverty, or any other characteristic asserted as a basis for
protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Nor will examining
skillfulness in legal reasoning provide a basis for assessing how a
nominee will adjust the crucial tensions in the constitutional matrix-between federal power and state power, between presidential power and congressional power, and between governmental
power and citizens' rights.
When a nation proposes to entrust a person with a lifetime appointment to a federal court, with authority to make the vast
range of crucial decisions that constitutional adjudication now
comprehends, it is entitled to have an extensive basis for determining the general direction of that person's constitutional views.
To state that proposition is not to take sides in the. recurrent controversy as to the appropriate scope of the Senate's decision-making, once the President has selected a nominee. Whether Senators
are entitled to oppose a nominee because of disagreement with
the nominee's legal viewpoints or, more precisely, at what point
the degree of difference between the nominee's views and those
of a Senator justifies opposition, is an important matter, but it is
an issue distinct from the scope of legitimate inquiry. It is not my
purpose here to attempt to determine the appropriate substantive
content of the "advise and consent" function. My focus is on the
procedural issue. To enlist the analogy of litigation, the issue is
not the standard of liability but the scope of discovery. Of course,
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the bounds of reasonable discovery are not entirely unrelated to
the substantive standard at issue, or at least to the plausible outer
limits of that standard. In urging fairly wide-ranging exploration
of a nominee's legal views, I must acknowledge my premise that
the advise and consent function includes the prerogatives of Senators to use some measure, however calibrated, to assess a nominee's
legal views and interpose objection when those views are deemed
unacceptable. I take it that even the broadest view of a President's
power to nominate and the most limited view of a Senator's right
to reject a nominee would acknowledge the legitimacy of opposing a nominee who favored a 'eturn to the,"separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.1
The scope of legitimate inquiry of a judicial nominee is usually
viewed as a continuum ranging from the most general probing of
judicial philosophy to the most precise questioning about specific
disputes likely to come before a court. If the worth of a judge and
the suitability of a nominee to become a judge depended only on
the results the judge reaches, there would be a compelling argument that those making the selection of judges should inquire
without limit, even as to likely results in impending disputes. Indeed, how is a President who campaigns on a promise to change
the outcome of some Supreme Court cases to fulfill that promise
without ascertaining the nominee's views on the correctness of
those decisions and, equally important, on the nominee's willingness to overturn them?
But results, though obviously important, are not all that matters. Adjudication is a process that serves vital interests in our
scheme of things, and maintaining respect for the integrity of that
process is essential to preserving public confidence in the rule of
law. We have already lowered that confidence to some degree by
educating the public to the undeniable fact that the identity of a
Supreme Court nominee will often affect the outcome of an issue
last decided by a vote of five to four. In a democracy, that plain
truth needs to be understood. But equally deserving of recognition, and much more difficult to communicate, is the more subtle
idea that deciding a constitutional issue is something quite distinct
'.163

U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
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from expressing a policy preference. As every judge knows, but as
the public scarcely comprehends at all, there is a fundamental difference between having a legislative view as to whether some outcome is desirable and having a judicial view as to whether that
outcome is constitutional, or between the legislative view that an
outcome is undesirable and the judicial view that it is unconstitutional. And there is a difference between a legislative view that
favors or opposes some policy and a judicial view that endeavors
conscientiously to determine the meaning of legislation. Underlying these differences is the crucial distinction between a policy
preference that a legislator might arrive at quickly because of basic philosophy, constituent pressure, or a combination of each,
and a judicial view forged more reflectively in the context of a
fully developed adversarial presentation of a concrete case. It is
these fundamental differences that create a tension between the
understandable interest in how a nominee might decide a case and
the threat to the integrity of the judicial process by eliciting a prejudgment of a case.
Though the public understands and will accept that the identity
of judicial nominees will affect results, it is entitled to have a judicial system administered by those who have not committed themselves to specific outcomes of specific cases. When the cases arrive,
the judge will be expected to do something significantly different
from the legislative task of expressing a policy preference. The
judge will be obliged to act like a judge-to make a reasoned adjudication. Of course, that adjudication will be influenced in part
by the judge's views about the adjudication process, but it should
not be influenced by a predisposition to an outcome already determined. The independence and lack of bias properly expected of
judges do not require that they have not thought about the governing principles that affect the resolution of close questions. But
they do require an honest capacity to apply the sum total of one's
judgment and intellect without a predetermined answer to a specific controversy.
The nominee should not be asked for the outcome of a specific
case for the obvious reason that the nominee, as judge, must be
eligible to act like a judge. That does not mean, of course, that a
judge cannot properly adjudicate a case calling for resolution of
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an issue that the judge has previously adjudicated. The judge
must adjudicate, and is entitled to act, with respect to recurring
issues. But taking a position on the outcome of a case in the
course of securing the approval of those responsible for making or
confirming a judicial appointment is not the process of
adjudication.
If the outcome of a particular case is not within the proper
scope of inquiry of judicial nominees, is the line to be drawn at
that point or further back along the continuum toward general
philosophy? I would draw the line right at that point and permit a
wide-ranging inquiry of all views that can fairly be expressed without prejudgment of particular cases. Though the judge is not being selected to express personal views on public policy, the judge
is being selected to adjudicate, and those making the selection are
entitled to know what the nominee thinks about the important
principles that will guide the process of adjudication. It is not
enough to elicit general statements about "judicial restraint" versus "judicial activism," or about "original intent" versus "interpretation," nor should the inquiry be considered useful when it
has ascertained only that the judge is committed to "applying the
law" rather than "making the law." These vague formulations are
virtually useless.
Those determining who should become lifetime members of the
federal judiciary should ascertain what the nominee thinks about
matters both general and specific. On general matters, what is the
role of courts in a constitutional democracy? What are the sources
of interpreting the Constitution? Are the clauses of the Constitution of equal weight? If there are differences, what determines the
weighting? Is the adjudicative task the same in applying the Constitution to contests between federal and state power, between
presidential and congressional power, and between governmental
power and citizens' rights? What are the criteria that guide the
judicial branch in determining when to adhere to precedents and
when to revise or overturn them? How should courts determine
the meaning of statutes-from text alone or from text and some
or all sources of legislative intent, and is the process of statutory
interpretation the same for all categories of statutes?
On specific matters, is there a legitimate role for substantive
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due process, and, if so, how can the doctrine be applied without
trenching on legitimate areas of legislative policy? Should equal
protection analysis be subject to differing levels of scrutiny, and, if
so, what are their characteristics? What principles can usefully delineate the line between free expression and regulated conduct?
What tests might usefully adjust the delicate tension between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause? Is there a constitutionally protected right to privacy, and, if so, to what categories of activity does it apply?
As inquiries such as these are pressed, there is some risk that an
answer might move into the sphere of prejudgment of specific
cases. The risk does not mean the inquiry should be abandoned. It
means only that both the questioner and the nominee should proceed with considerable care. Not every question will be appropriate. Not every question need be answered. The nominee will not
have a fully developed view on every question. On some topics,
the nominee will have given little, if any, thought and might quite
legitimately prefer to defer formulating a position until the issue
is fleshed out by the context of concrete cases. Just as each nominee will have to decide where to draw the line, so will each Senator asking the questions. The result need not yield a neat pattern.
But in the aggregate, the questioning can elicit a considerable basis for informed judgment. Ultimately, the Senate will have to decide whether the nominee has answered to a degree sufficient to
enable the Senate to discharge its "advise and consent" responsibility. If the nominee declines to provide an adequate basis for
decision, the Senate should not hesitate to reject the nominee
solely on that ground.
During the process by which I was selected to become a United
States Circuit Judge, I experienced an inquiry of considerable substantive content. Between 1977 and 1980, President Carter had
committed himself to selecting circuit judges only from lists of
candidates submitted by citizens' commissions, established in each
of the judicial circuits.' Along with some forty others under consideration for two newly created judgeships on the Court of Appeals for. the Second Circuit, I appeared for an individual inter2 See 42 Fed. Reg. 9659 (Feb. 14, 1977).
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view before a thirteen-member group-seven lawyers and six nonlawyers. The chairman was Lawrence E. Walsh. The interview
lasted for about an hour. The questions were focused and penetrating. Some concerned what I have characterized as general aspects of adjudication. Others became quite specific. I was pressed
in particular about my views of the appropriate scope of affirmative action in the context of judicial remedies for discrimination. I
thought the entire inquiry was fair and appropriate, and I endeavored to answer as fully as I could. On occasion, I conceded that I
had not yet formulated a position which would enable me to be
fully responsive to a particular inquiry. Ultimately, my name was
included on a list of eight candidates forwarded by the citizens'
commission to the President, from which two nominations were
made. The ensuing Senate hearing on my nomination was far less
searching.'
The Senate Judiciary Committee would do well to conduct for
all nominees for the federal courts at least as extensive an inquiry
as was pursued by the lawyers and non-lawyers of the citizens'
commissions during the administration of President Carter.
II.

RESOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT

There can be no doubt that allegations of misconduct are properly within the scope of an inquiry into the fitness of individuals to
become lifetime members of the federal judiciary. The issue posed
by such allegations concerns procedure-how should such allegations be investigated and how should fact-finding be conducted to
resolve allegations that are not demonstrably groundless?
For any allegation of substance, the investigative stage is appropriately handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Differences of opinion will inevitably arise as to which allegations merit
an FBI investigation, and careful judgments will have to be made.
Few events in a person's lifetime serve so clearly to identify one's
friends and one's enemies as the prospect of appointment to the
federal judiciary. Discretion must be exercised in separating malicious gossip from factually supported allegations.
See Selection and Confirmation of FederalJudges: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 111-15, 118-24 (1979).
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Of those allegations with sufficient substance to merit investigation, some will turn out upon investigation to be groundless. The
serious question is how should fact-finding be conducted in those
instances where investigation develops conflicting evidence concerning allegations of substance.
There is a reasonable argument that fact-finding to resolve such
allegations should be conducted in open hearings. Public interest
in the allegations will normally be intense, and there is a risk that
public confidence in the fact-finding process would be impaired if
it were conducted behind closed doors. If only results of the factfinding were disclosed, some could legitimately question whether
the public would accept either a rejection or an approval of a
nominee. These are substantial concerns, but in my view, they are
outweighed by the shortcomings of trying to perform serious factfinding as to allegations of misconduct in public hearings.
The Senate hearing is part of a political process. Fact-finding is
an adjudicative task. When those in the political process endeavor
to perform a fact-finding task as to matters of alleged misconduct
by a judicial nominee, there is an apparently irresistible tendency
to politicize the process, a tendency that public hearings magnify
to an unacceptable degree. Senators understandably see public
hearings as a forum in which to persuade the public that the allegation is either true or not true. An objective inquiry to ascertain
the facts of the alleged misconduct does not occur. Instead, as recent events have shown, the Senators divide at the outset, based
on their views of whether the nominee should be confirmed. Senators of the party whose President made the nomination seek to
disprove the allegation, and most Senators of the opposite party
seek to prove the allegation. Now, the adversary process has its
strengths, and a proceeding is obviously not inevitably worthless
as a fact-finding exercise simply because the questioners take sides
at the beginning of the process. But when the adversary process
functions well, as it usually does in a courtroom, it does so under
the firm control of an impartial hearing officer, with the authority
and inclination to enforce rules of evidence and keep the inquiry
tightly focused. An adversary process conducted in a public Senate hearing, no matter how fair minded the committee chair may
be, is doomed to degenerate into an intensely partisan battle, in
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which the emergence of truth would be almost an accident. Television, of course, only compounds the problem.
A comparison may usefully be drawn between a Senate hearing
into allegations of misconduct by a judicial nominee and the process by which the federal judiciary resolves allegations of misconduct against federal judges. By statute, complaints of misconduct
by federal judges may be filed by any person. 4 Most are dismissed
without a hearing, either because the complainant is misusing the
misconduct procedure as an avenue for pursuing matters that may
be raised on an appeal or because the allegations are demonstrably frivolous. On rare occasion, a complaint survives dismissal by
the chief judge of the circuit and a special committee is formed. 5
The committee consists of the chief judge of the circuit and an
equal number of circuit and district judges. Typically, the committee consists of five judges.
The special committee conducts an investigation, requesting assistance from the FBI where appropriate. The committee conducts a hearing to which the complainant, the accused judge, and
other witnesses are called to testify. The hearing is not open to
the public. A transcript is made. The judges pose questions in a
serious effort to ascertain whether the allegations are true or
false. The committee submits a report of its findings and recommendations to the judicial council. The council may dismiss allegations determined not to be established, or take a variety of disciplinary actions for allegations that are established.
Though special committees have been infrequently required in
the twelve years since the judicial misconduct statute was enacted,
they have functioned effectively in a variety of circumstances, including an allegation of sexual misconduct. The inquiries of which
I am aware have been conducted thoroughly and fairly. Confidentiality has been scrupulously maintained. No doubt the luxury of
not having to seek reelection contributes to the constructive environment in which federal judges administer the judicial misconduct statute, and it would not be realistic to suppose that a Senate
hearing on misconduct allegations against a judicial nominee
28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988).
' See id. § 372(c)(4).
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could be conducted in precisely the same manner. But the judicial
misconduct hearing, conducted behind closed doors by disinterested officials who are endeavoring conscientiously to find facts,
rather than bolster preconceived positions, provides a useful
model for the Senate Judiciary Committee when it is obliged to
consider misconduct allegations against judicial nominees.
CONCLUSION

A broad-ranging inquiry into the views of judicial nominees and
a discreetly conducted inquiry into allegations of a nominee's misconduct would enhance the Senate's constitutional obligation to
"advise and consent" to the appointment of federal judges.

